In the Lucas Imperfect Information model, output responds to unanticipated monetary shocks. We incorporate more general information structures into the Lucas model and demonstrate that output also responds to (dispersedly) anticipated monetary shocks if the information is imperfect common knowledge. Thus, the real effects of money consist of the unanticipated part and the anticipated part, and we decompose the latter into two effects, an imperfect common knowledge effect and a private information effect. We then consider an information structure composed of public and private signals. The real effects disappear when either signal reveals monetary shocks as common knowledge. However, when the precision of private information is fixed, the real effects are small not only when a public signal is very precise but also when it is very imprecise. This implies that a more precise public signal can amplify the real effects and make the economy more volatile.
Introduction
In the Lucas Imperfect Information model (Lucas, 1972 (Lucas, , 1973 , which formalizes the idea of Phelps (1970) , markets are decentralized and agents in each market have only limited information about prices in other markets. As a consequence, output responds to unanticipated monetary shocks; that is, imperfect information about prices generates real effects of money. However, if monetary shocks are anticipated, no real effects arise. This implies that monetary shocks cannot have lasting effects, which is considered to be a serious shortcoming of the Lucas model. This shortcoming is attributed to the assumption that all agents share information about the economy except the prices in their own markets (Townsend, 1983; Phelps, 1983) ; that is, the information is common knowledge. Based on this observation, Woodford (2003) introduces a model departing from the Lucas model in three respects: (i) agents have idiosyncratic private information, (ii) they adopt a monopolistically-competitive pricing framework, and (iii) information processing is dynamic. Then, he demonstrates the persisting real effects numerically.
In his model, the problem to find a solution is complicated, but the solution can be obtained numerically.
In this paper, we introduce a model departing from the Lucas model in one aspect: agents are allowed to have any combination of information as imperfect common knowledge. More specifically, we study the Lucas model with arbitrary Gaussian information structures. Thus, the underlying model is simpler than that of Woodford (2003) , but the information structure is more general. Our approach has two advantages. First, we follow the standard formulation of the Lucas model, also appearing in textbooks such as Romer (2019) , and thus the role of information in our model is more plainly understood when it is compared to that in the original model. Next, we can provide a closed-form solution for each Gaussian information structure, which enables us to study the role of information analytically. On the other hand, the Lucas model has no dynamics, which is the limitation of our approach. This paper focuses on the impact of imperfect common knowledge on the real effects in one period rather than that on the lasting effects over multiple periods.
First, we demonstrate that the real effects consist of the unanticipated shock effect and the (dispersedly) anticipated shock effect. The expected value of the unanticipated shock effect equals zero, but that of the anticipated shock effect does not. Thus, the anticipated shock effect is indeed anticipated, but the expected value differs across different markets. We also show that the anticipated effect is composed of a private information effect, which depends upon the prediction in each market, and an imperfect common knowledge effect, which depends upon the aggregate prediction.
Next, we focus on the information structure in which agents receive a combination of a (common) public signal and a (idiosyncratic) private signal. In this case, the private information effect is a linear combination of a private signal and an unobserved monetary shock, and the imperfect common knowledge effect is a linear combination of a public signal and an unobserved monetary shock. The real effects are largest when either signal does not convey any information about monetary shocks, and they disappear when either signal reveals monetary shocks as common knowledge. However, when the precision of private information is fixed, the real effects are small not only when a public signal contains very precise information but also when it contains very imprecise information. Thus, a more precise public signal can amplify the real effects and make the economy more volatile. The intuition behind this result can be understood in terms of the law of large numbers. When a public signal is very imprecise, agents mainly use idiosyncratic private signals in predicting monetary shocks, and thus the aggregate prediction is very precise by the law of large numbers, thereby reducing the aggregate uncertainty and the real effects. In contrast, when a public signal is not so imprecise, agents use a public signal as well, and thus the aggregate prediction correlated with a public signal is less precise by the failure of the law of large numbers, amplifying the aggregate uncertainty and the real effects.
Finally, we show that the predicted aggregate price level in each market in the Lucas model is mathematically equivalent to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian game studied by Radner (1962) . This observation is useful because the existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium is implied by those in the corresponding Bayesian game. When the number of separated markets is infinite, the corresponding Bayesian game is given by a beauty contest game studied by Morris and Shin (2002) . Morris and Shin (2002) also point out a similar connection: they consider a modified version of the Lucas model which requires each separated market to clear and show that the price in each market corresponds to an equilibrium action in a beauty contest game. Thus, our discussion complements the discussion of Morris and Shin (2002) by showing that, in the case of the standard Lucas model which requires the aggregate market to clear, the predicted aggregate price level in each market corresponds to an equilibrium action in a beauty contest game. Note the difference between the predicted aggregate price level in each market and the price in each market: this difference determines the level of supply in each market in the Lucas model. The impact of public information discussed in this paper is also independently found by Hellwig (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003) for the model of Woodford (2003) , as noted in Hellwig (2008) . It is also related to the main finding of Morris and Shin (2002) . Morris and Shin (2002) examine the mean squared error of the equilibrium action of each player from the state as a measure of a welfare loss in a beauty contest game and show that it can increase with the precision of public information. In contrast, we examine the variance of output in the Lucas model as a measure of the real effects, which is shown to be equivalent to the mean squared error of the aggregate equilibrium action from the state in a beauty contest game, and show that it can increase with the precision of public information.
The organization of this paper is as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2. Assuming symmetric Gaussian information structures, we obtain the market equilibrium in a closed form in Section 3. Then, we study the impact of public information on the real effects in Section 4.
Section 5 is devoted to the connection between the Lucas model and Bayesian games studied by Radner (1962) and Morris and Shin (2002) .
The Lucas model with imperfect common knowledge
We consider the Lucas Imperfect Information model (Lucas, 1972 (Lucas, , 1973 , which also appears in textbooks such as Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 356) and Romer (2019, p. 293) . We follow the standard formulation, but we drop the assumption that suppliers share information about the economy.
The economy consists of n separate competitive markets, each of which is called an island.
Let y i and p i denote the logarithms of output and the nominal price of the output, respectively, in island i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The supply function in island i is
where b > 0 is a constant, p = n −1 n i=1 p i is the aggregate price level in logarithm, I i is the information about the economy available in island i which is independent of the relative price p i − p, and E[ · |I i , p i ] is the expectation operator conditional on I i and p i . The equation (1) implies that suppliers increase output when they perceive an increase in the expected relative
In the standard formulation, I i is the same for all i, but we allow I i to differ across i.
Given I i , the conditional joint distribution of p and p i is normal with the same expected value, i.e, E[p i − p|I i ] = 0. Then, by the property of normal distributions, there exists θ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Thus, (1) is rewritten as
where
We assume that θ does not depend upon i and I i .1
We can obtain the following aggregate supply function by taking the aggregation of (3) over i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
with I i = I, and thus (4) is reduced to
which is the famous Lucas supply function. Output in (5) is increasing in the price surprise p − E p. In contrast, output in (4) is increasing in the aggregation of the price surprise in each
The aggregate demand function is
where m is nominal money in logarithm. This is one of the simplest possible ways to model aggregate demand, which is derived form the quantity equation in logarithm m + v = p + y together with the assumption that the velocity in logarithm v equals zero.
Then, the market clearing condition is
by (4) and (6), which is rewritten as
1For example, assume that z i = p − p i is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 z = cσ 2 p , where σ 2 p is the endogenously determined variance of p and c > 0 is constant. That is, prices in separated markets are more volatile and dispersed when the aggregate price level is more volatile. Then, θ = 1/(1 + c).
where r = β/(1 + β). OperatingĒ on both sides in (8) gives
By repeating this, we obtain the following representation of p:
whereĒ (k+1) =ĒĒ (k) for k ≥ 1. Moreover, by plugging (9) into (6), we obtain the following representation of y:
We will establish the existence (i.e. the convergence) of (9) and (10) in Section 5.
When I i is the same for all i and thus E i = E, the law of iterated expectations holds, i.e., E (k) m = Em for all k ≥ 1, and thus (10) is reduced to
This equation shows the key implication of the standard Lucas model: an unanticipated monetary
shock has real effects on output, whereas an anticipated monetary shock has no such effects.
In contrast, when I i differs across i, the law of iterated expectations does not hold, i.e.,
as will be calculated in a closed form in the next section. This implies that not only an unanticipated monetary shock but also an anticipated monetary shock has real effects. To demonstrate it, we decompose (10) into the following three terms for each i:
We call the first term an unanticipated shock effect because E i (m − E i m) = 0. We call the second term a private information effect because it is the difference between the expectation E i m in island i and the aggregate expectationĒm. We call the last term an imperfect common knowledge effect because it is attributed to imperfect common knowledge of information and the resulting failure of the law of iterated expectations. It should be noted that the real effects induced by the second and third terms are in fact anticipated in the sense that the expected values of these terms are not equal to zero.
Gaussian information structures
In this section, we calculate the real effects of money on output in a closed form. To this end, we assume that information available in island i is a random vector x i ∈ R L and that (m, x 1 , . . . , x n ) is normally distributed with mean zero, i.e., E[m] = 0 and E[x i ] = 0 for all i. We also assume that the covariance structure is symmetric with respect to the exchange of islands:
for all i, i , j, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i i and j j ,
it holds that E i m = Mx i and E i x j = Ax i for all i j.
Using M and A, we calculate (9) and (10). Letx = n −1 i x i and A n = (n − 1)n −1 A + n −1 I, where I is a unit matrix. Then,
. .
for all k ≥ 2. By plugging (12) into (9) and (10), we obtain
where r (m − Mx i ) is the unanticipated shock effect, r (Mx i − Mx) is the private information effect, and r M − (1 − r)M(I − r A n ) −1 x is the imperfect common knowledge effect. The last two effects are anticipated because the expected value of the private information effect in island i is
and that of the imperfect common knowledge effect is
which are nonzero as long as the coefficient matrices in (16) and (17) are not zero matrices.
Public and private signals
In this section, we focus on the Gaussian information structure with x i consisting of public and private signals and study the impact of each signal on the real effects of money. In so doing,
we consider the limiting case as the number of islands goes to infinity, which substantially simplifies the calculation, but we can also obtain a similar result in the finite case.
The signal in island i is
where v i is a private signal and w is a public signal. Random variables m, ε i , and ε 0 are independently normally distributed with mean zero and variance τ −1 m , τ −1 v , and τ −1 w , respectively. The reciprocal of the variance of a private signal τ v is referred to as the precision of private information, and that of a public signal τ w is referred to as the precision of public information.
Note that
Thus, (13), (14), and (15) are rewritten as
.
The private information effect in the second term is a linear combination of v i and m, and the imperfect common knowledge effect in the third term is a linear combination of w and m. Note that, when a private signal contains no information about m (i.e., τ v = 0), the second and third terms vanish, in which case the model is reduced to the standard Lucas model.
As a measure of the real effects, we adopt the variance of y and represent it as a function of
Note that money has no real effects if V(τ) = 0 because y is a constant for any m in this case. It is straightforward to show that
Thus, money has the largest real effects if there is no information about m (i.e., τ v = τ w = 0).
In contrast, money has no real effects if either signal reveals the true value of m (i.e., τ v = ∞ or τ w = ∞). However, when the precision of private information is fixed, money has very small real effects not only when a public signal is very precise but also when it is very imprecise, as the next proposition shows. That is, V(τ) is not a monotone function of τ w , whereas it is a decreasing function of τ v .
Proposition 1. The variance of y is decreasing in τ v ; that is,
The variance of y is increasing in τ w if τ w < (1 − r)τ − τ m and decreasing in τ w if τ w >
(1 − r)τ − τ m ; that is,
which implies that
Proof. A direct calculation yields
, which implies the proposition.
Fix τ v > 0. If τ v < τ m /(1 − r) (i.e., the precision of private information is sufficiently low), V(τ) is decreasing in τ w , and thus V(τ) is maximized when τ w = 0 (i.e., a public signal contains no information about m). However, if τ v > τ m /(1 − r) (i.e., the precision of private information is sufficiently high), V(τ) is increasing in τ w for τ w < (1 − r)τ v − τ m , and thus V(τ) is maximized when τ w = (1 − r)τ v − τ m (i.e., a public signal contains noisy information about m).
To explain the intuition behind the above result, note that
by (4). Thus, V(τ) equals the mean squared error of the aggregate expectationĒ p from the true value of p (times a constant β 2 ). If the precision of public information is very low, the correlation between E i p and E j p is also very low, soĒ p is close to p by the law of large numbers, which results in small real effects. However, as the precision of public information increases, the correlation between E i p and E j p also increases, soĒ p is not necessarily close to p by the failure of the law of large numbers, which results in larger real effects.
We can formally discuss the above intuition in the limiting case as τ m → 0; that is, m has an improper prior. In this case, the expected value of m in island i is
Now assume that τ w = 0; that is, a public signal contains no information. Then, E i m = v i and Em = m by the law of large numbers. This implies that p = m by (9), y = 0 by (10), and thus V(τ) = 0, which implies the following proposition. That is, money has no real effects not only when a public signal reveals m but also when it conveys no information about m. In other words, the real effects arise if and only if a public signal conveys noisy information about m. This is because, in the absence of a public signal, there is no uncertainty in the aggregate expectationĒm = m, thus eliminating the volatility of the economy. A similar argument applies as long as τ m is sufficiently small compared to τ v . This is why a more precise public signal can amplify the real effects and make the economy more volatile.
Finally, we evaluate the anticipated real effects. By direct calculation, the expected value of y in island i is
and its variance is We can obtain the value of τ which maximizes V E (τ), but it is a solution to a system of quadratic equations, so we do not calculate it here.
The Lucas model and Radner's Bayesian game
In this section, we demonstrate that the market equilibrium in the Lucas model is mathematically equivalent to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian game studied by Radner (1962) . This observation is useful because the existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium is implied by those in the corresponding Bayesian game established by Radner (1962) . When once the market equilibrium is interpreted as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Proposition 1 is closely related to the findings of Morris and Shin (2002) and Ui and Yoshizawa (2015) .
The market equilibrium as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Let a i = E i p be the expected aggregate price level in island i. By (8), a i is a solution to
which is rewritten as
where α 1 = rn −1 /(1 − rn −1 ) and α 2 = (1 − r)/(1 − rn −1 ). This equation can be interpreted as the first order condition for the problem to maximize
with respect to a i . In other words, (a i ) i∈{1,...,n} is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian game with a quadratic payoff function
where a i ∈ R is player i's action and m ∈ R is a payoff state. As pointed out by Ui (2009) , this game is a Bayesian potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; van Heumen et al., 1996) which has the same best correspondence as that of a Bayesian game with an identical payoff
Radner ( It is straightforward to show that (22) is strictly concave if and only if −1 < α 1 < 1/(n − 1).
Note that α 1 = rn −1 /(1 − rn −1 ) < 1/(n − 1). Thus, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (E i p) i∈{1,...,n} exists, which also guarantees the convergence of (9) and (10). In the case of Gaussian information structures, we can also obtain E i p in a closed form using the results of Radner (1962) to calculate y = m − p = r(m −Ē p), which coincides with (14).
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition. 
Morris and Shin (2002)
In the limit as n → ∞,3 (20) is reduced to
Note that (23) can be interpreted as the first order condition of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian game with a payoff function
where f (ā, m) is a function of (ā, m). A Bayesian game with the above payoff function is referred to as a beauty contest game because player i's best response given by (23) is the expected value of the weighted average of the opponents' aggregate actionā and the payoff state m.
Morris and Shin (2002) consider a beauty contest game with the same Gaussian information structure as that discussed in Section 4 assuming that τ m = 0 (i.e., an improper prior). They also point out the equivalence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a beauty contest game and the market equilibrium in the Lucas model, but their discussion is based upon a modified version of the Lucas model. Instead of the aggregate demand (6), Morris and Shin (2002) assume that island i has its own demand function y i = E i m − p i and require that demand should equal supply in each island, i.e., E i m − p i = β(p i − E i p) for all i. This is rewritten as p i = r E i p + (1 − r)E i m, which coincides with (23) when p i = a i and p = lim n→∞ n −1 i p i . Therefore, the price p i in island i coincides with the action a i of player i in a beauty contest game.
In contrast to Morris and Shin (2002) , we follow the standard formulation of the Lucas model; that is, we require the market clearing condition m − p = β(p −Ē p) in the aggregate market. By Proposition 3, the expected aggregate price level E i p in island i coincides with the action a i of player i in a beauty contest game. Note the difference between the price p i in island i and the expected aggregate price level E i p in island i, which determines the supply in island i
3On the application of Radner's theorem in the case of infinite number of players, see Ui and Yoshizawa (2013) .
In their main result, Morris and Shin (2002) study the property of the mean squared error of the equilibrium action a i from the payoff state m
as a measure of a welfare loss, which is the same for all i by the symmetry of payoff and information structures, and show that
In Proposition 1, we study the property of the variance of y given by V(τ). Note that
by (8), which implies that V(τ) equals a constant times the mean squared error of the aggregate equilibrium action4ā =Ē p from the payoff state m
Proposition 1 in the special case of τ m = 0 is summarized as follows:
It is interesting to compare (24) and (26) in our context of the Lucas model, where a i = E i p is the prediction of the aggregate price level in island i, andā =Ē p is the aggregate prediction of the aggregate price level. The mean squared error of the prediction in each island and that of the aggregate prediction share the following properties.
• MSE[a i ] and MSE[ā] are minimized and equal to zero when τ v = ∞ or τ w = ∞.
• 
Ui and Yoshizawa (2015)
Ui and Yoshizawa (2015) also consider a Bayesian Nash equilibrium given by (20) under the same Gaussian information structure as that discussed in Section 4 and study the property of the following function:
which is the expected value of a quadratic function of the equilibrium actions and the payoff state. They show that there exist constants ζ, η, ξ ∈ R such that We can regard V(τ) is a special case of (27) with a i = E i p and obtain the following representation of V(τ). 
Because (23) 
